Appropriating Women’s Thoughts: The Admissibility of Sexual Fantasies and Dreams Under the Consent Exception to Rape Shield Laws by Albin, Ramona C.
 
617 
Appropriating Women’s Thoughts: The 
Admissibility of Sexual Fantasies and Dreams 
Under the Consent Exception to Rape Shield Laws 
Ramona C. Albin* 
INTRODUCTION 
A woman and her best friend are having coffee.  The woman tells her 
best friend that she fantasized about having sex with one of their 
classmates.  If that classmate subsequently rapes the woman and his 
defense is that the woman consented to have sex with him, the court 
could admit evidence concerning the woman’s sexual fantasy as 
evidence of consent.  The woman’s voiced thought, her fantasy, is not 
sexual conduct.  Nonetheless, the woman’s imaginative thought may be 
considered “sexual behavior,” a sexual act, under rape shield laws and is 
potentially admissible to show her consent.  Similarly, if a woman tells 
her co-worker that she had a dream about having sex with him and a 
week later he rapes her, her dream––her unconscious thought––is also 
potentially admissible as evidence of consent.  Under current rape shield 
laws, a woman’s thoughts—imagined, or even unconscious—may be 
appropriated as evidence of consent. 
This phenomenon is consistent with rape law reflecting social norms 
regarding the deviancy of women’s sexuality.  For example, before the 
enactment of rape shield laws in the 1970s, rape law rebuked women 
who were sexually active outside of the marital relationship by allowing 
evidence of the rape victim’s character for non-chastity to show consent 
or to attack her credibility as a witness.1  The justification for allowing 
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such evidence was that unchaste women—women who had sexual 
relations outside of marriage—violated social norms, were of deficient 
character, and were more likely to have consented to sex with the 
defendant or falsely accused the defendant of rape.2  Traditional rape law 
reflected a “normative command that women maintain an ideal of sexual 
abstinence in order to obtain legal protection”—a “chastity 
requirement.”3 
While a majority of states limited this character evidence to 
reputation evidence as to chastity, a minority of states also allowed 
evidence of “specific prior acts of unchastity.”4  In all jurisdictions, 
however, in the context of a consent defense, specific acts of unchastity 
with the defendant were admissible where the defendant raised consent 
as a defense.5  And showing that a victim was unchaste, where the 
defendant alleged consent, was a complete defense.6  Rape trials often 
devolved into referendums on the victim’s character for chastity rather 
than focusing on the conduct of the defendant.7 
Today, rape shield laws generally prohibit admission of evidence of 
the victim’s prior sexual behavior and sexual predisposition.8  There are 
exceptions, however, to this general prohibition.  Significantly, evidence 
of the victim’s sexual behavior with the defendant may still be 
 
this Article. 
 1. See Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1977) [hereinafter Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation] 
(explaining that courts considered the “victim’s character for chastity” as being “pertinent to whether 
or not she consented to the act that led to the charge of rape” and to “the woman’s credibility”); see 
also Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a 
New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (2002) (“The law traditionally insisted 
that the sexual history of a woman who alleged that she was raped was relevant to the truth of her 
allegation.”). 
 2. Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for 
the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 783–84 (1986). 
 3. Anderson, supra note 1, at 53. 
 4. State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946, 950 (Ariz. 1976) (en banc).  
 5. Galvin, supra note 2, at 785–86. 
 6. See Norman v. State, 230 S.W. 991, 992 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (“The Legislature 
apparently has selected appropriate language in which to declare that in such a case, the prosecutrix 
being over 15 years of age when the act was committed, and the proof showing that she was of 
previous unchaste character, no conviction can result.”); see also Galvin, supra note 2, at 766 
(“Evidence of previous sexual conduct was deemed relevant at common law on the issue of whether 
the rape complainant had consented to sexual relations on the occasion in question—a complete 
defense, if established, to a charge of forcible rape.”).   
 7. Galvin, supra note 2, at 792–93.  
 8. See FED. R. EVID. 412(a).  Rape shield laws allow admission of a woman’s sexual history 
under various exceptions, and the general prohibition is therefore less of a ban than a sieve.  
Anderson, supra note 1, at 112–13. 
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admissible if the defendant claims consent.9  This means if the defendant 
claims that the sexual activity was consensual, then evidence of prior 
sexual behavior of the victim with the defendant may be admissible, 
whereas evidence of her sexual predisposition is not.  Thus, in the 
context of a consent defense, not only is the victim’s physical conduct 
with the defendant potentially admissible, but so are her voiced sexual 
fantasies and dreams about the defendant.10  And these sexual fantasies 
or dreams are potentially admissible even in the absence of any other 
prior physical conduct with the defendant.11 
In other words, the same rationale that was the foundation of the 
chastity requirement applies to the admissibility of women’s sexual 
fantasies and dreams under the consent exception—women who express 
sexual fantasies act outside social norms, have deficient character, and 
therefore such evidence is relevant to consent.  Essentially, the chastity 
requirement still applies to women’s thoughts.  If women voice sexual 
fantasies or dreams, it evidences her consent, just as women’s prior 
sexual conduct with others was supposedly relevant to consent under 
traditional rape law.  As one commentator noted, “female sexuality that 
fails to conform to normative standards sits uneasily with rape shield 
law.”12 
Sexual fantasies and dreams, based on imagined or even unconscious 
thoughts, do not make the fact of consent more or less likely.  But, even 
though such evidence is not relevant to consent, courts have admitted it.13  
Any arguable relevance is based on unfounded stereotypes of female 
sexuality, i.e., that women must be mentally and physically chaste, and 
women who have sexual fantasies “want it” or are somehow deviant.  
The admissibility of such evidence plays into these stereotypes and may 
cause unwarranted conclusions based on those stereotypes—a 
 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B). 
 10. This Article focuses on the admissibility of women’s sexual fantasies under the consent 
exception because most victims of sexual assault are women and most perpetrators are men.  From 
1995 to 2010, approximately 91% of rape and sexual assault victims were female and 9% were male.  
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994–2010, at 3 (2013), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf [https://perma.cc/SPG2-3ZAK] (citing National 
Crime Victimization Survey data compiled from 1995–2010).  In 2010, 98.1% of female rape 
victims reported only male perpetrators.  MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY 
PREVENTION & CONTROL, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 
2010 SUMMARY REPORT 24 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_report 
2010-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/23GN-YMQP] [hereinafter NISVS REPORT].   
 11. See Commonwealth v. Young, 182 S.W.3d 221, 222 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) (finding 
admission of the victim’s sexual fantasy about the defendant did not violate Kentucky’s rape shield 
rule).  
 12. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461, 1490 (2012). 
 13. See, e.g., Young, 182 S.W.3d at 222. 
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circumstance rape laws were enacted to prevent.14  For example, it is 
well settled that women’s rape fantasies are not about a desire to be 
raped and do not involve wish fulfillment.15  Yet, rape fantasies have 
been admitted as evidence of consent.  Such a voiced fantasy fits neatly 
into unfounded tropes about women’s desire to be raped.  In a 1952 
article published in the Yale Law Journal, the authors, writing 
anonymously, argued that “a woman’s need for sexual satisfaction may 
lead to the unconscious desire for forceful penetration, the coercion 
serving neatly to avoid the guilt feelings which might arise after willing 
participation.”16  
The admission of rape fantasy evidence to show consent under 
current rape shield laws shows that this stereotype is alive and well.17  Its 
admission supports the belief that rape fantasies concern wish 
fulfillment, rather than an experience for the woman herself.  If jurors 
believe a rape fantasy is wish fulfillment and the defendant claims 
consent, then the admission of the fantasy has enormous potential to 
cause unfair prejudice and an unwarranted outcome.  At bottom, the 
admission of such evidence results in the appropriation of women’s 
thoughts to limit legal protection. 
This Article examines the admissibility of women’s sexual fantasies 
and dreams under the consent exception, traces its origins, highlights its 
application, argues that sexual fantasies and dreams should not be 
admissible under the consent exception, and proposes a practical solution 
to address this problem. 
Part I describes Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the federal rape shield 
law.  Rule 412 prohibits evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged 
in other sexual behavior or to prove the victim’s sexual predisposition.18  
The Rule contains several exceptions, including the consent exception, 
which allows the admission of specific instances of the victim’s “sexual 
behavior” with the defendant if the defendant argues consent.19  Under 
the consent exception, the victim’s “sexual behavior” may be admissible 
 
 14. See Memorandum from Professor Margaret Berger, Reporter, to the Advisory Comm. on 
Rules of Evidence (May 3, 1993) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Berger, Solutions Memo]. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the 
Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 67 (1952) (footnotes omitted). 
 17. See People v. Garcia, 179 P.3d 250, 255 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[E]vidence of the victim’s 
alleged rape fantasy, including her statements to defendant concerning the fantasy, is material and 
relevant, and should have been admitted.”). 
 18. FED. R. EVID. 412(a). 
 19. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B). 
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to show consent, but the victim’s sexual predisposition is not.20  The 
1994 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 412 defines 
“sexual behavior” to include actual physical behavior and “activities of 
the mind, such as fantasies or dreams.”21  On that basis, a women’s 
sexual fantasies and dreams may be admissible to prove consent. 
Part II traces the origins of Rule 412 and its amendment in 1994.  
This section shows that the goal of that amendment, related to the 
criminal provisions, was to broaden the general prohibition of the rule so 
that evidence that did not fit neatly into the category of sexual behavior, 
such as sexual fantasies and dreams, was also excluded.  Part III 
describes cases where state courts have admitted evidence of sexual 
fantasies to prove consent.  Those courts rely, at least in part, on the 
definition of “sexual behavior” in the 1994 Amendment Advisory 
Committee Notes to Rule 412. 
Part IV argues that sexual fantasies and dreams should be 
inadmissible under the consent exception for four reasons.  First, 
evidence of a victim’s sexual fantasies and dreams are not “behavior” in 
any meaningful sense and should not be categorized as such.  Second, 
such evidence is not relevant to the issue of consent because a woman’s 
fantasies and dreams, her imaginative or even unconscious thoughts, are 
not probative of consent.  Third, even if arguably relevant, the probative 
value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair 
prejudice.  Finally, the admission of sexual fantasies and dreams is 
contrary to the purpose of rape shield laws.  This Article proposes a 
practical solution to address this problem under the current rule: The 
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 412 and courts should categorize 
evidence of sexual fantasies and dreams as sexual predisposition rather 
than sexual behavior.  This approach would ensure that a victim’s 
thoughts are still excluded by the general prohibition under the Rule, yet 
not appropriated to show consent—effectuating the intent of rape shield 
laws. 
I. THE FEDERAL RAPE SHIELD LAW AND “ACTIVITIES OF THE MIND” 
AS SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 
The federal rape shield law, Federal Rule of Evidence 412, is 
designed to “safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, 
potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with 
 
 20. Id.  
 21. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
622 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual 
innuendo into the factfinding process.”22  In other words, the federal rape 
shield law was promulgated to protect victim privacy, encourage 
reporting of sex offenses, and prevent unfair prejudice endangering 
rational verdicts.  The rule currently provides, in relevant part: 
Rule 412.  Sex-Offense Cases: The Victim’s Sexual Behavior or 
Predisposition 
(a)  Prohibited Uses.  The following evidence is not admissible in 
a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: 
(1)  evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other 
sexual behavior; or 
(2)  evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition. 
(b) Exceptions. 
(1) Criminal Cases.  The court may admit the following 
evidence in a criminal case: 
(A)  evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual 
behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the 
defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other 
physical evidence; 
(B)  evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual 
behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual 
misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent 
or if offered by the prosecutor; and 
(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the 
defendant’s constitutional rights.23 
Under the general prohibition of Rule 412, as applied to criminal 
cases involving sexual misconduct, evidence offered to prove that a 
victim engaged in other “sexual behavior” or evidence offered to prove a 
victim’s “sexual predisposition” is not admissible.24  The original rule, 
enacted in 1978, only prohibited admission of evidence of a victim’s past 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. FED. R. EVID. 412(a), (b)(1) (emphasis added).  The civil exception to the Rule is not 
included because this Article focuses on its application to criminal cases. 
 24. FED. R. EVID. 412(a). 
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“sexual behavior.”25  That rule did not include Advisory Committee 
Notes or a definition of sexual behavior. 
In 1994, Congress amended the Rule, expanding the general 
prohibition to include not only sexual behavior but also sexual 
predisposition.26  Most importantly, the 1994 Amendment Advisory 
Committee Notes defined “sexual behavior” as “all activities that involve 
actual physical conduct, i.e. sexual intercourse and sexual contact,” or 
that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact.27  The term “behavior” 
also includes “activities of the mind, such as fantasies or dreams.”28  
Specifically, referencing the general prohibition in Rule 412(a), the 
Advisory Committee Notes state: 
 Past sexual behavior connotes all activities that involve actual 
physical conduct, i.e. sexual intercourse and sexual contact.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 418 (1992) (use of contraceptives inadmissible since use 
implies sexual activity); United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736 
(8th Cir. 1983) (birth of an illegitimate child inadmissible); States v. 
Carmichael, 727 P.2d 918, 925 (Kan. 1986) (evidence of venereal 
disease inadmissible).  In addition, the word “behavior” should be 
construed to include activities of the mind, such as fantasies or dreams.  
See 23 C. Wright & K. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 
5384 at p. 548 (1980) (“While there may be some doubt under statutes 
that require ‘conduct,’ it would seem that the language of Rule 412 is 
broad enough to encompass the behavior of the mind.”).29 
Because “sexual behavior” includes both physical conduct and sexual 
fantasies and dreams of the victim, such evidence is generally not 
admissible under Rule 412. 
Unlike “sexual behavior,” “sexual predisposition” is not defined in 
the 1994 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes, nor is sexual 
predisposition defined elsewhere in the Rules of Evidence.  However, the 
1994 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes provide some general 
guidance.  The Notes provide that predisposition evidence does not refer 
to sexual activities or thoughts, but is evidence that “may have a sexual 
connotation for the factfinder.”30  According to the Notes, “mode of 
 
 25. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 2046, 
2046 (1978). 
 26. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 
40141(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 1919 (1994). 
 27. FED. R. EVID. 412(a) advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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dress, speech, or life-style” would all be barred in criminal cases as 
evidence of sexual predisposition.31  The Notes explain that such 
evidence should be excluded because its admission would “contravene 
Rule 412’s objectives of shielding the alleged victim from potential 
embarrassment and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical 
thinking.”32  Case law provides little additional guidance regarding the 
definition of predisposition and primarily relies on the language in the 
1994 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes.33 
But the general prohibition barring evidence of the victim’s other 
sexual behavior or sexual predisposition is not absolute.  Rule 412 
provides several exceptions, one of which allows the admission of 
specific acts of a victim’s sexual behavior with the defendant where the 
defendant raises a consent defense.34  Under the consent exception, 
evidence of a victim’s “sexual behavior” with the accused may be 
admissible, but evidence of a victim’s sexual predisposition is not.35  
This is a significant exception because most victims know the 
perpetrator, and therefore defendants often use consent as a defense.36 
Because the victim’s sexual fantasies and dreams are categorized as 
“sexual behavior” rather than “sexual predisposition,” a victim’s sexual 
 
 31. Id.  Such evidence, however, may be admissible under the constitutional exception.  This 
exception, Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(1)(C), allows the trial court to admit evidence in a 
criminal case where its exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.  FED. R. EVID. 
412(b)(1)(C).  If the accused can show that exclusion of the evidence, whether sexual behavior or 
sexual predisposition, would violate his constitutional rights, then that evidence may be admitted.  
Id.  Predisposition evidence may also be admissible under the civil exception to Rule 412(b)(2).  
FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2). 
 32. FED. R. EVID. 412(a) advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
 33. See Ratts v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 189 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D. Kan. 1999) (relying on the 
Advisory Committee Notes for the proposition that “[s]exual predisposition includes evidence that 
may express a sexual connotation”); see also Glazier v. Fox, No. 2014-106, 2016 WL 827760, at *3 
(D.V.I. Mar. 2, 2016) (relying on same passage from the Advisory Committee Notes).  Because 
sexual predisposition may be admissible in civil cases, there is more civil case law on sexual 
predisposition.  Those cases do not define sexual predisposition, however, beyond the general 
description provided by the 1994 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes. 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B). 
 35. Id.  This argument assumes that state rape shield laws bar sexual predisposition evidence as 
well as sexual behavior evidence.  Not all do.  If they do not, they should, for the same reasons 
Congress amended Federal Rule of Evidence 412 to add sexual predisposition to the general 
prohibition. 
 36. Most victims of rape and sexual assault cases know their attacker.  See NISVS REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 21 (finding that only 13.8% of victims reported that a stranger raped them).  See 
also Victims and Perpetrators, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 26, 2010), https://www.nij.gov/topics 
/crime/rape-sexual-violence/Pages/victims-perpetrators.aspx [https://perma.cc/3N3U-CQVP] (citing 
BONNIE S. FISHER, ET AL., BUREAU OF JUDICIAL STATISTICS, NCJ NO. 182369, THE SEXUAL 
VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 17 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6U8T-856X]) (“A study of sexual victimization of college women showed that 9 
out of 10 victims knew the person who sexually victimized them.”). 
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fantasies and dreams may be admissible to prove consent.  In fact, the 
1994 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes specifically state that a 
victim’s “voiced sexual fantasies involving the accused” may be 
admissible under the consent exception.37 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE 1994 AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RAPE 
SHIELD LAW 
Before Congress promulgated Federal Rule of Evidence 412, states 
enacted rape shield laws to prohibit the admission of evidence related to 
a victim’s chastity in rape and sexual assault cases.38  Michigan passed 
the first rape shield law in 1974.39  By 1976, at least twenty-four states 
had passed rape shield laws.40  There was no federal rule, however, 
limiting the use of evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior.  Such 
evidence was admissible under Rule 404(a)(2), which allowed the 
introduction of “evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of 
the crime offered by an accused.”41  The Advisory Committee Notes to 
Rule 404(a)(2) provided that “an accused may introduce pertinent 
evidence of the character of the victim, as in support of a claim of . . . 
consent in a case of rape.”42  Federal case law provided for the 
admissibility of specific instances of the victim’s prior sexual behavior 
and reputation and opinion evidence of the victim’s character for chastity 
and circuit courts found reversible error where such evidence was 
excluded.43 
 
 37. FED. R. EVID. 412(b) advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.  Relevant to Rule 
412(b)(1)(B), the Notes state:  
Under the exception in subdivision (b)(1)(B), evidence of specific instances of sexual 
behavior with respect to the person whose sexual misconduct is alleged is admissible if 
offered to prove consent, or offered by the prosecution.  Admissible pursuant to this 
exception might be evidence of prior instances of sexual activities between the alleged 
victim and the accused, as well as statements in which the alleged victim expressed an 
intent to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, or voiced sexual fantasies 
involving that specific accused.   
Id.  
 38. See, e.g., Shand v. State, 672 A.2d 630, 631 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) (giving an overview of 
Maryland’s rape shield statute); see also Privacy of Rape Victims: Hearings on H.R. 14666 and 
Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 
1 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rep. William L. Hungate, Chair, Subcomm. on 
Criminal Justice) (“A number of States have addressed this issue and have modified their laws to 
make such evidence less easily admissible.”). 
 39. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 2019). 
 40. Hearings, supra note 38, at 2 (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman).  
 41. Id. at 1 (statement of Rep. William L. Hungate, Chair, Subcomm. on Criminal Justice).  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 4; see also Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 1953) (finding 
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A. Introduction of Rule 412 
In 1976, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman sponsored legislation 
creating Rule 412 “to provide for the protection of the privacy of rape 
victims.”44  During a July 29, 1976, hearing on the legislation, a Deputy 
Chief of the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice stated that 
there was no basis in experience to support the premise that an 
“unchaste” witness is less credible than a “chaste” witness.45  He also 
rejected the notion that “chastity” has a bearing on consent, and  further 
explained that any marginal relevance of such evidence would be 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice resulting in an irrational 
verdict.46  As to the scope of the proposed rule, the former National Rape 
Task Force Coordinator for the National Organization for Women, Mary 
Ann Largen, testified about the sexual stereotypes surrounding rape 
prosecutions.47  Ms. Largen explained that “[b]ecause the courts confuse 
rape with healthy sexual union, the victim must also deny any healthy 
history of, or interest in, sex in order to deny an implication of an 
‘unconscious desire’ to be violated.”48  She also discussed the significant 
evidentiary hurdles facing rape victims; that is, that rape victims, unlike 
any other victim, must not simply show that she was raped, but she must 
also show she did not want to be raped on a conscious or even 
subconscious level.49 
On October 28, 1978, Congress passed the Privacy Protection for 
Rape Victim’s Act of 1978,50 amending the Federal Rules to add 
protection for rape victims as codified in Rule 412.  The Rule provided, 
in relevant part: 
Rule 412.  Rape Cases; Relevance of Victim’s Past Behavior 
(a)  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case 
in which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to 
 
reversible error where the trial court excluded evidence of the victim’s “prior unchaste conduct” with 
an individual other than the accused), overruled by United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 
1978).  
 44. Hearings, supra note 38, at 2 (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman).  
 45. Id. at 4 (statement of Roger A. Pauley, Deputy Chief, Legislation and Special Projects 
Section, Criminal Division). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 30. 
 48. Id. at 31 (statement of Mary Ann Largen, Former N.O.W. Nat’l Rape Task Force 
Coordinator). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046 (1978). 
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commit rape, reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual 
behavior of an alleged victim of such rape or assault is not 
admissible. 
(b)  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case 
in which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to 
commit rape, evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior other 
than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless 
such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is— 
(1)  admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2) 
and is constitutionally required to be admitted; or 
(2)  admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is 
evidence of— 
(A)  past sexual behavior with persons other than the 
accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether 
the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged 
victim, the source of semen or injury; or 
(B)  past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered 
by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged 
victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to 
which rape or assault is alleged.51 
Rule 412 thus provided that in rape or assault to commit rape cases, 
reputation or opinion evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior and 
specific instances of the victim’s past sexual behavior was generally 
inadmissible.52  At that time, the federal rape shield law only applied in 
cases of rape or assault to commit rape, did not apply to other criminal 
cases or civil cases, and did not define sexual behavior.53  Rule 412 also 
included several exceptions.54  Like the current rule, the victim’s past 




 51. Id. § 2(a). 
 52. See id. 
 53. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 did not include Advisory Committee Notes when originally 
enacted. 
 54. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act § 2(a). 
 55. Id. 
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B. 1994 Amendment to Rule 412 
In the early 1990s, Congress considered amending Rule 412.  The 
Rule was “criticized as confusing and overly-complex.”56  In addition, 
the Rule was criticized as too limited because it did not apply to civil 
cases.57  Concerned that Congress would amend Rule 412 without 
complying with the Rules Enabling Act and circumvent the Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee) of the Judicial 
Conference, the Standing Committee’s Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure began to consider amendments to 
Rule 412.58  This Advisory Committee supported amending Rule 412 and 
voted to “make it applicable in all civil and criminal cases.”59  
Additionally, the Advisory Committee agreed in principle to expand the 
general prohibition to include evidence offered not only to prove that a 
victim engaged in other sexual behavior but also evidence offered to 
prove a victim’s sexual predisposition to address the uncertainty created 
by the term “sexual behavior” and whether a victim’s “disposition” 
would fall within that category.60  The consent exception remained 
substantially the same, allowing evidence of specific instances of the 
victim’s sexual behavior with the accused to prove consent.61  The 
 
 56. Memorandum from John Rabiej, Chief, Rules Comm. Support Office, Admin. Office of 
U.S. Courts, to Karen Kremer, Counsel, Legislative & Pub. Affairs Office 2 (July 8, 1992) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Memorandum from John Rabiej]. 
 57. See id. (arguing that because Rule 412’s standard differs from Rule 404(a) and only applies 
in “criminal sexual abuse cases,” it is hard to “understand[] the appropriate standards under all the 
potential permutations created by the interplay of different types of cases, the variety of claims and 
defenses, and the methods of proving character”). 
 58. Judicial Conference of the U.S., Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 12–13 (May 13–14, 1991), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR05-
1991-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T56-NKDM] [hereinafter Criminal Procedure Advisory Committee 
Minutes May 13–14, 1991]. 
 59. Judicial Conference of the U.S., Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 5–6 (Nov. 7, 1991), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR11-1991-
min.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XUN-BQZW]; see also Memorandum from Steve Saltzburg to the 
Evidence Subcomm. of the Advisory Comm. on Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 (Mar. 8, 1992), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR1992-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SR9-
CGQ5] [hereinafter Memorandum from Steve Saltzburg]. 
 60. Memorandum from John Rabiej, supra note 56, at 2–3.  The April 1992 draft by the 
Evidence Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
concerning the consent exception stated: “(a) Evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior or sexual 
predisposition is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding except as provided in subdivision 
(b).”  Id. at 3. 
 61. The April 1992 draft by the Evidence Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning the consent exception stated: “(b) Evidence of a 
victim’s past sexual behavior or predisposition may be admitted under the following 
circumstances: . . . (2) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior with the person whose 
sexual misconduct is alleged if offered to prove consent.”  Id. at 4.  This exception is substantially 
 
2020] APPROPRIATING WOMEN’S THOUGHTS 629 
proposed draft amended rule and committee notes by this Advisory 
Committee do not appear to define sexual behavior or sexual 
predisposition.62 
In November 1992, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee to the 
Standing Committee modified the language adopted by the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.63  The modified 
rule still included the general prohibition barring evidence of a victim’s 
past sexual behavior and sexual predisposition, subject to certain 
exceptions.64  This version also included a consent exception allowing 
“evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior with the person 
accused of the sexual misconduct, when offered to prove consent by the 
victim.”65  The Committee Note also did not include language 
establishing that sexual behavior under the Rule (and the consent 
exception) included activities of the mind, such as fantasies or dreams, 
and did not include language that voiced sexual fantasies by the victim 
involving the accused may be admissible under the consent exception.66 
At its December 1992 meeting, the Standing Committee considered 
the Civil Rules and Criminal Rules Committees’ drafts of an amended 
Rule 412 and blended the two.67  The resulting Standing Committee draft 
contained both (1) the general prohibition language barring evidence of 
the victim’s sexual behavior and sexual predisposition and (2) the 
consent exception for specific instances of the victim’s sexual behavior 
with the accused.68  Importantly, the accompanying Committee Note did 
not contain any language defining sexual behavior or sexual 
 
the same as the consent exception in the 1978 version, except it removed “past sexual behavior with 
the accused” under Rule 412(b)(2)(B) and replaced it with “evidence of specific instances of sexual 
behavior.”  Additionally, the introductory language to the exception includes sexual behavior and 
sexual predisposition, but only sexual behavior is referenced in the consent exception under (b)(2).  
 62. See Memorandum from Steve Saltzburg, supra note 59, at 3–5 (Steve Saltzburg’s proposed 
redraft of Rule 412); id. at 11–15 (attachment of Dave Schlueter’s proposed amendment to Rule 
412); Memorandum from John Rabiej, supra note 56; Criminal Procedure Advisory Committee 
Minutes May 13–14, 1991, supra note 58, at 12–14.   
 63. See Memorandum from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. 
Robert E. Keeton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Nov. 20, 1992). 
 64. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES TO THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5–6 (1992) (on file with 
author).  
 65. Id. at 9.  
 66. See id.  
 67. Memorandum from Dave Schlueter, Reporter, to the Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules 
(Mar. 15, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum from Dave Schlueter].  
 68. Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 144 F.R.D. 447, 559–
63 (1992). 
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predisposition.69  Because of concern about Congress enacting an 
amendment to Rule 412 outside of the rules enabling process, the 
Standing Committee fast-tracked the process of amending Rule 412 and 
expedited the comment period.70  An Advisory Committee on the Rules 
of Evidence was appointed to hold hearings and spearhead the 
amendment.71 
Before the first meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of 
Evidence, the Advisory Committee Reporter, Professor Margaret Berger, 
drafted two memorandums for the Committee: one titled “Comments 
Received with Regard to 412 Amendments” (the “Comments Memo”),72 
and the other titled “Possible Solutions to Issues Raised with Regard to 
Rule 412” (the “Solutions Memo”).73  In the Comments Memo, Professor 
Berger addressed public comments asking about the scope of sexual 
behavior and sexual predisposition covered by the statute and the 
absence of a definition for predisposition.74  Professor Berger explained 
that sexual thoughts, fantasies, and dreams fit within the category of 
predisposition, not sexual behavior.75  Additionally, Professor Berger 
noted that such evidence was not sufficiently probative to be admissible.  
Professor Berger stated: 
 Although neither the proposed rule nor the Committee Note offer a 
definition of “predisposition,” I suspect that the term was intended to 
embrace a number of situations that have fit awkwardly, if at all, into 
the “sexual behavior” requirement.  Federal and state courts have 
considered the admissibility of evidence of sexual thoughts, such as 
fantasizing, delusions, and dreams, and the admissibility of conduct 
other than physical sexual acts, such as viewing pornography, working 
as a topless dancer, nudity, and provocative dressing.  The omission of 
“predisposition” in clause (b)(3), rather than being a drafting oversight, 
may represent a judgment of the drafters that while predisposition 
evidence should be excluded because of its potential to embarrass and 
 
 69. See id. at 569–77. 
 70. Judicial Conference of the U.S., Minutes of the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 7–9 (Dec. 17–19, 1992), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST12-
1992-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/U297-KU67] [hereinafter Practice and Procedure Committee 
Minutes Dec. 17–19, 1992]. 
 71. Judicial Conference of the U.S., Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 12 (Apr. 22–23, 1993) (on file with author); Memorandum from Dave Schlueter, supra 
note 67. 
 72. Memorandum from Professor Margaret A. Berger, Reporter, to the Advisory Comm. on 
Rules of Evidence (May 3, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Berger, Comments Memo]. 
 73. Berger, Solutions Memo, supra note 14.  Professor Berger was a faculty member at the 
Brooklyn Law School. 
 74. Berger, Comments Memo, supra note 72, at 5–6, 8–11, 20. 
 75. Id. 
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humiliate, its probative value will never be high enough to justify 
admission.76 
According to Professor Berger, the predisposition category was intended 
to cover evidence “offered for the inference that the victim engaged in 
prior sexual conduct,” but did not fall within the category of “sexual 
misconduct,” including evidence such as “dreams, fantasies, partying, 
[and] watching pornography”—evidence that had insufficient probative 
value for admission in a criminal sexual assault case.77 
In the Solutions Memo, Professor Berger explained that 
predisposition evidence “appeals to sexual stereotyping” and has “so 
little probative value or indeed relevance that it would never be 
constitutionally required.”78  The addition of sexual predisposition to the 
general prohibition of Rule 412 was designed to focus on evidence that 
did not fit neatly into the definition of sexual behavior and had little 
probative value but had the potential to invade a woman’s privacy and 
cause unwarranted conclusions.79 
Professor Berger also recommended that the Advisory Committee 
should agree on the scope of the rule before addressing definitional 
issues.80  Professor Berger explained that, in a number of state cases, 
evidence did not clearly constitute “sexual behavior,” and therefore was 
not subject to the general prohibition established by the rule.81  She 
outlined three areas of controversy related to the definition of sexual 
behavior: (1) fantasies, dreams, and statements in diaries; (2) conduct 
with a sexual connotation that is not a sexual activity, such as posing for 
nude photos or watching pornography; and (3) conduct that occurred in 
public that may have a sexual connotation, such as, dress or partying.82  
Professor Berger noted that a “sensible definition of ‘sexual behavior’ 
coupled with the added ban on ‘predisposition’ evidence” would cover 
any evidence falling into these categories.83  According to Professor 
Berger, that approach would not only protect victim privacy, but would 
 
 76. Id. at 5–6.  Professor Berger responded to a concern that the constitutional exception (at that 
time Rule 412(b)(3)), which “allow[ed] on constitutional grounds only ‘evidence of specific 
instances of sexual behavior,’” did not include predisposition evidence, such as showing that the 
alleged victim was a prostitute.  Id. at 5. 
 77. Id. at 20. 
 78. Berger, Solutions Memo, supra note 14, at 7.  
 79. Id. at 1–2.  
 80. Id. at 1. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1–2.  
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also protect victims “from unwarranted conclusions based on sexual 
stereotyping” and “encourage victims to come forward when they have 
been sexually assaulted or harassed.”84  Thus, Professor Berger 
concluded, if the rule was intended to exclude such evidence to achieve 
those purposes, then it was unclear whether the rule and commentary 
provided sufficient definitions of sexual behavior and sexual 
predisposition.85  And the public comments reflected confusion and 
concern about the meaning of sexual behavior and sexual 
predisposition.86 
Professor Berger recommended amending the rule and/or the 
commentary to address these concerns.  Specifically, she suggested 
adding the following two paragraphs, where the language referencing 
“activities of the mind” was adopted from Wright and Graham’s Federal 
Practice and Procedure,87 to the Committee Note to clarify the breadth 
of the general prohibition covering sexual behavior and sexual 
predisposition: 
 Past sexual behavior connotes all activities that involve actual 
physical conduct consisting of sexual intercourse or sexual contact or 
that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
418 (1992) (use of contraceptives inadmissible since use implies sexual 
activity); United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(birth of an illegitimate child inadmissible); State v. Charmichael, 727 
P.2d 918, 925 (Kan. 1986) (evidence of venereal disease inadmissible).  
In addition, the word “behavior” should be construed to include 
activities of the mind, such as fantasies or dreams.  See Charles A. 
Wright & Kenneth A. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 
5384 at p. 548 (1980) (“While there may be some doubt under statutes 
that require ‘conduct,’ it would seem that the language of Rule 412 is 
broad enough to encompass behavior of the mind.”). 
 The rule has been amended to also exclude all other evidence 
relating to an alleged victim of sexual misconduct that is offered to 
imply a sexual predisposition.  This amendment is designed to exclude 
evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but 
that the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the fact 
finder.  Admission of such evidence would contravene Rule 412’s 
objective of shielding the alleged victim from potential embarrassment 
and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical thinking.  
 
 84. Id. at 2.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.; see also Berger, Comments Memo, supra note 72, at 5–6, 8–11, 17, 20. 
 87. 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE (1980). 
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Consequently, unless the (b)(4) exception is satisfied, evidence such as 
that relating to the alleged victim’s mode of dress, speech, posing in the 
nude, and life style will not be admissible.88 
Based on the above draft, White and Graham’s conclusion in 1980 that 
the term “sexual behavior” in the Rule was broad enough to cover 
“behavior of the mind” formed the apparent justification for 
characterizing “activities of the mind” as “sexual behavior” in the 1994 
Amendment Advisory Committee Notes.89  White and Graham, however, 
categorized “behavior of the mind” as sexual behavior when Rule 412 
only included the term “sexual behavior” (the original 1978 version of 
the Rule).90  In other words, for Rule 412’s general prohibition to cover 
thoughts in 1980, they had to be considered sexual behavior because 
categorizing thoughts as sexual predisposition was not an option at that 
time.  Thus, reliance on Wright and Graham as justification for 
categorizing thoughts as sexual behavior, rather than sexual 
predisposition, is extremely problematic. 
This proposed language was ultimately adopted and included in the 
1994 Amendment to the Rule.91  The purpose of this language appeared 
to be to expand the coverage of the general prohibition, whether the 
evidence fell within “sexual behavior” or “sexual predisposition.”  
Unfortunately, the consequence of including “activities of the mind,” 
such as fantasies or dreams, within the definition of sexual behavior 
meant that such “activities of the mind” would be admissible as evidence 
of consent.  If sexual fantasies and dreams had been categorized as 
sexual predisposition, rather than “sexual behavior,” then such evidence 
would be inadmissible under the general prohibition of Rule 412(a) as 
well as the consent exception of 412(b)(1)(B). 
The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence met on May 6 
and 7, 1993.92  The Committee discussed the use of the word 
 
 88. Berger, Solutions Memo, supra note 14, at 4.  In this iteration of the amended Rule, (b)(4) 
referenced the civil exception.  When Congress amended Rule 412, the civil exception was within 
(b)(2).  See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 
40141(b)(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 1919 (Sept. 13, 1994). 
 89. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
 90. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 87, § 5384.   
 91. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.  
 92. Judicial Conference of the U.S., Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence 
1 (May 6–7, 1993), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV05-1993-min.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D2FU-GNBM] [hereinafter Evidence Advisory Committee Minutes May 6–7, 
1993].  This committee was under pressure to finalize the draft rule.  The chair of the committee 
informed committee members at this meeting that discussion regarding Rule 412 needed to be 
completed before the Standing Committee meeting on June 16–17, 1993, because of pending 
congressional legislation.  Id. at 2.  See also Practice and Procedure Committee Minutes Dec. 17–19, 
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“predisposition” in the general prohibition section.93  Some “suggested 
that ‘predisposition’ be replaced with evidence offered to show a claimed 
or asserted ‘propensity.’”94  Professor Berger explained that she tried to 
establish “two different categories: sexual behavior involves actual 
sexual activity whereas predisposition describes evidence that is being 
offered for a sexual innuendo.”95  The Committee accepted the use of the 
word predisposition.96  The Minutes do not reflect a discussion of the 
inclusion of “activities of the mind” as sexual behavior in the Committee 
Note, nor any discussion of the potential impact of such language on the 
consent exception.97 
The Standing Committee met in June 1993 and approved the 
substance of the rule the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence 
adopted and substantially adopted the proposed committee note.98  That 
approved note included the definitions of sexual behavior and 
predisposition proposed in the “Solutions Memo,” and also included 
language that voiced sexual fantasies of the victim involving the specific 
accused may be admissible under the consent exception as sexual 
behavior of the victim.99 
Ultimately, Rule 412 was not amended through the rulemaking 
process because the Supreme Court withheld its approval, not because of 
the provisions related to criminal cases but because of the application of 
 
1992, supra note 70, at 8.  Moreover, the minutes of this meeting reflect that the committee 
determined they would not need to republish the rule, thereby extending the rulemaking process up 
to another year and a half, unless there were material changes to the rule.  Evidence Advisory 
Committee Minutes May 6–7, 1993, supra, at 5.  In other words, there was to be no material changes 
to the rule that had already been published for comments.  The Committee was concerned that 
Congress would amend the rule in the interim without input from the Judicial Conference.  Id. 
 93. Evidence Advisory Committee Minutes May 6–7, 1993, supra note 92, at 5. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  The minutes reflect that the Committee discussed whether use of predisposition implies 
that a victim’s dress or lifestyle involves sexuality.  Id.  For that reason, the Committee decided to 
insert “offered to prove” after evidence to address this issue.  Id.  
 97. There was considerable discussion about the application of the rule to civil cases, the test 
used in civil cases, whether the consent exception applied in civil cases, and several issues related to 
the applicability of the rule to civil cases.  Specifically, the Committee discussed whether the 
“consent provision should be expanded to deal with the welcomeness issue in civil sexual 
harassment cases.”  Id. at 7.  The Committee ultimately decided that civil and criminal cases needed 
to be addressed separately under the rule.  Id. 
 98. Judicial Conference of the U.S., Minutes of the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 19–20 (June 17–19, 1993), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST06-
1993-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AQJ-YG84].  The Standing Committee added language that would 
allow the prosecutor to admit specific instances of the victim’s sexual behavior with the accused 
when the defendant alleges consent as the defense.  Id. 
 99. Memorandum from J. Ralph K. Winter & Professor Margaret Berger to the Advisory 
Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Supp. A (June 22, 1993) (on file with author). 
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the rule as drafted to civil cases.100  Congress ultimately enacted this 
formulation of Rule 412 as drafted by the Advisory Committee on Rules 
of Evidence and the Standing Committee.101 
Although the amended Rule 412 expanded the types of evidence 
covered by the general prohibition, the categorization of sexual fantasies 
and dreams as sexual behavior (rather than predisposition) impacted the 
reach of the consent exception.  The Amendment had the concomitant 
effect of allowing evidence of a woman’s thoughts—evidence that may 
result in irrational verdicts based on sexual stereotypes—to be admissible 
in cases involving a consent defense. 
III. COURTS ADMIT SEXUAL FANTASIES AS EVIDENCE OF CONSENT 
Every state has promulgated a rape shield law containing some 
general prohibition and exceptions to that prohibition, including a 
consent exception.102  State courts have admitted evidence of sexual 
fantasies by relying on the language in the 1994 Amendment Committee 
Notes to Rule 412, defining sexual behavior as activities of the mind, 
including sexual fantasies and dreams.  The characterization of women’s 
thoughts as sexual behavior rather than sexual predisposition in Rule 412 
impacts the admissibility of women’s thoughts in state and federal 
courts. 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Young, the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky affirmed a circuit court order admitting a victim’s voiced 
sexual fantasy.103  The victim claimed that a police officer “stopped her 
for a traffic violation and . . . coerced her into having sexual intercourse 
 
 100. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to John Gerry, Chair of the Exec. Comm. of 
the Judicial Conference (Apr. 29, 1994) (on file with author). 
 101. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40141, 
108 Stat. 1796, 1918–19 (Sept. 13, 1994).  The Supreme Court withheld approval of the proposed 
amendment to Rule 412 as applied to civil cases.  The Court stated that Rule 412(b) might abridge a 
civil defendant’s substantive rights under Meritor Saving Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  In 
Meritor, the Court recognized that evidence of an alleged victim’s “sexually provocative speech or 
dress” may be relevant in workplace harassment cases.  Id. at 69.  The Advisory Committee on Rules 
of Evidence disagreed with the Supreme Court, explaining that “the proposed rule did not overrule 
Meritor.”  Judicial Conference of the U.S., Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of 
Evidence 2 (May 9–10, 1994), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ev5-9.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4X6Y-QDZF].  Both houses of Congress amended their bills and used the language 
drafted by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence.  See Judicial Conference of the U.S., 
Minutes of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 3 (June 23–24, 1994), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST06-1994-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QCM-
L8D5]. 
 102. For a list of state statutes, see 1 BARBARA E. BERGMAN ET AL., WHARTON’S CRIMINAL 
EVIDENCE § 4:41 n.39, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019).   
 103. 182 S.W.3d 221, 222 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005). 
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with him in lieu of being arrested.”104  The officer, Barry Young, was 
charged with first-degree rape, among other crimes.105  The victim was a 
confidential informant for the police department who eventually reported 
the rape when she learned that Young planned to visit the county 
attorney’s office while she was there assisting law enforcement in a drug 
investigation.106  Young alleged consensual sex as a defense.107 
The Kentucky rape shield law, Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 
412, is modeled on Federal Rule of Evidence 412.108  Like the federal 
rule, KRE 412 states that evidence offered to prove the victim engaged in 
other sexual behavior and evidence offered to prove the victim’s sexual 
predisposition is inadmissible in a case involving sexual misconduct.109  
KRE 412(b)(1)(B) also provides several exceptions, including an 
exception for “specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim 
with respect to the person accused” when the accused claims consent.110 
Before trial, Young gave notice of his intent to introduce evidence 
covered by the Kentucky rape shield law.111  Among other things, Young 
sought to introduce evidence that the victim had earlier told her co-
worker that she had a sexual fantasy about him.112  The victim told her 
co-worker that she wanted to have sex with Young that “would melt the 
ice in the water cooler” and that she “wanted some of that,” referring to 
Young.113 
The Commonwealth argued that the victim’s alleged behavior before 
the rape “did not constitute sexual behavior and therefore, would not be 
admissible under KRE 412(b)(1)(B).”114  According to the 
Commonwealth, that exception only applies “to actual sexual contact 
between the parties.”115  The Commonwealth argued that the victim’s 
alleged statements were evidence of sexual predisposition, rather than 
sexual behavior, because the victim “did not act on her wishes at the 
time,” and thus were inadmissible under the exception.116  The trial court 
 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 223. 
 106. Id. at 222–23. 
 107. Id. at 222. 
 108. Id. at 224. 
 109. KY. R. EVID. 412(a). 
 110. KY. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B).  
 111. Young, 182 S.W.3d at 223. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 224.  
 114. Id. at 223.  
 115. Id. at 223–24. 
 116. Id. at 224. 
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rejected the Commonwealth’s argument and ruled that the evidence was 
admissible.117 
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court 
ruling.118  Citing the 1994 Amendment Committee Notes to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 412, the court held that sexual thoughts or fantasies 
constitute sexual behavior under the rule, rather than sexual 
predisposition, and are thus admissible under the consent exception.119  
The court concluded that “[s]ince the prosecuting witness’ sexual fantasy 
was directed toward Young, the trial court properly found that it 
constituted sexual behavior which is admissible under KRE 
412(b)(1)(B).”120  The 1994 Amendment Committee Notes’ 
characterization of sexual fantasies as sexual behavior was determinative 
in the admission of the victim’s alleged sexual fantasy as evidence of 
consent.121  The court therefore found that a victim’s sexual fantasy—not 
even communicated directly to the defendant—was relevant and 
admissible.122 
The Colorado Court of Appeals took a similar approach in People v. 
Garcia.123  There, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial where 
the trial court excluded evidence of the victim’s alleged rape fantasy.124  
In Garcia, the victim and the defendant were involved in an intimate 
relationship for six months (according to the victim) or one year 
(according to defendant Garcia).125  The victim testified that she 
terminated the relationship at least six months before the sexual assault, 
while Garcia claimed the parties had consensual sex up to one week 
before the alleged assault.126  Before trial, Garcia filed a “Motion to 
Introduce Evidence of Prior Sexual Conduct of [the victim]” under the 
Colorado rape shield law.127  The trial court denied the motion, finding 
the proffered evidence did not fit within an exception to the rape shield 
law.128 
At trial, the victim testified that on the date of the sexual assault, she 
 
 117. Id. at 222. 
 118. Id. at 224–25. 
 119. Id. at 224. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. 179 P.3d 250, 252–53 (Colo. App. 2007).   
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 253. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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saw Garcia in the hallway of her apartment complex after she put her key 
in her door lock to enter.129  Garcia then turned the key for her and went 
into the victim’s apartment, stating that he just wanted to talk.130  After 
speaking for about fifteen or twenty minutes, Garcia stated, “Well, I 
guess I’m just going to have to do this.”131  He pulled out a knife, put the 
knife to the victim’s throat, dragged her into the bedroom, threw her on 
the bed, and bound her hands and feet with tape.132  He also forced her to 
drink liquor and told her that they were “going to have a little party” and 
then she would watch him die.133  He then “cut off her shirt and bra, 
pressed the knife to her throat, and forced her to perform fellatio.”134  
Garcia told her he was “going to do what you’ve not let me do,” which 
the victim interpreted as meaning anal sex.135  She was so afraid and 
upset that she defecated on herself.136  After this, Garcia washed her, 
removed the tape binding her hands and feet, and allowed her to go to the 
bathroom.137  They talked further and Garcia again told the victim he was 
going to kill himself.138  Garcia asked the victim if they could have 
sex.139  The victim ultimately agreed “because of the knife” and Garcia’s 
mental state.140  After intercourse, Garcia left and the victim called a 
friend, who called the police.141 
Garcia sought to impeach the victim’s testimony with an offer of 
proof that he would testify that he and the victim had prior consensual 
anal sex, a sexual relationship until one week before the sexual assault, 
and “[t]he victim had a rape fantasy that they had acted out on numerous 
occasions.”142  The trial court ruled that the prior consensual sexual 
history between the two was irrelevant to Garcia’s consent defense.143  
During cross-examination, the victim stated that she told a detective that 
Garcia said during the sexual assault, “[R]emember your rape fantasy?  
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
2020] APPROPRIATING WOMEN’S THOUGHTS 639 
Well, here it is.”144  But the victim denied any rape fantasy.145 
Before Garcia testified, the court advised him that he could not 
testify about any sexual matters before the date of the sexual assault, 
including any sexual fantasy of the victim.146  Garcia could testify, 
however, about a sexual fantasy that occurred on the date of the sexual 
assault.147  At trial, Garcia testified that all sexual conduct was 
consensual and the victim asked him to bind her hands and feet.148  When 
defense counsel tried to introduce evidence that the victim allegedly told 
Garcia, “[W]e could do it the way I like to do it, my favorite fantasy,” 
and described what that meant, the trial court sustained the state’s 
objection.149 
The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in 
excluding Garcia’s testimony about his prior sexual relationship with the 
victim, Garcia’s claim that the victim had a rape fantasy that they acted 
out several times, and the victim’s alleged statements about the rape 
fantasy.150  Specifically, regarding the alleged rape fantasy, the court held 
the alleged statements were material and relevant to Garcia’s consent 
defense, and therefore admissible.151  The court reasoned that the 
victim’s alleged statements to Garcia about the rape fantasy was not 
evidence of sexual conduct under the statute because “[t]he fantasy could 
be established without revealing whether the victim had ever acted it 
out.”152  According to the court, the trial court abused its discretion 
because it improperly applied the rape shield law to this evidence at 
all.153 
Curiously, the court relied on the fact that the victim’s alleged 
 
 144. Id. at 254. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 255–56. 
 151. Id. at 255. 
 152. Id. (citations omitted).  The Colorado Rape Shield Statute provides, in relevant part:  
Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s or a witness’s prior or subsequent sexual 
conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s or a witness’s sexual conduct, and reputation 
evidence of the victim’s or a witness’s sexual conduct may be admissible only at trial and 
shall not be admitted in any other proceeding . . . .  At trial, such evidence shall be 
presumed to be irrelevant except: (a) Evidence of the victim’s or witness’[s] prior or 
subsequent sexual conduct with the actor . . . . 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(1) (2014) (emphasis added).  Compare FED. R. EVID. 412 (using the 
term “sexual behavior” and/or “sexual predisposition”), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(1) 
(2014) (using the term “sexual conduct”).  
 153. Garcia, 179 P.3d at 255. 
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statements concerned thoughts, rather than actions, and the jury would 
not be prejudiced by statements of the victim’s thoughts.154  The court 
stated, “[W]e do not view the victim’s statements regarding her fantasy 
to be unfairly prejudicial.  These statements concerned thoughts, not 
actions.  We discern no reason why a jury would be prejudiced against 
the victim for merely having voiced a fantasy.”155  In other words, 
according to the court, sexual fantasies are not actions and therefore the 
jury would not consider such evidence.156  Even applying a Colorado 
Rule of Evidence 403 analysis, the court still admitted the evidence.157  
Paradoxically, although the majority opinion implied that a fantasy has 
limited probative value, and therefore the jury would not be prejudiced 
against the victim for having such thoughts, the majority also found that 
the victim’s fantasies were not only relevant, but also material to 
Garcia’s consent defense.158 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Bernard agreed with the result but 
disagreed with the majority’s finding that the victim’s statements about a 
rape fantasy were not sexual conduct under the Colorado rape shield 
statute.159  Relying on the language of the statute, precedent, and Federal 
Rule of Evidence 412, Judge Bernard argued that sexual fantasies fall 
within the scope of sexual conduct under the Colorado rape shield 
statute.160  Judge Bernard relied on the 1994 Amendment Committee 
Notes to Rule 412, which state that past sexual behavior included 
activities of the mind, such as fantasies and dreams.161  He explained the 
expansive view of sexual conduct was necessary because only then 
would the general prohibition cover sexual fantasies.162   
Judge Bernard emphasized the importance of rape shield laws in 
rejecting dangerous stereotypes regarding female sexuality.163  Judge 
Bernard quoted Wigmore on Evidence, which as recently as 1970 
suggested that “[t]he unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental 
 
 154. Id. at 258. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 257–58; see also COLO. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”). 
 158. Garcia, 179 P.3d at 256. 
 159. Id. at 259 (Bernard, J., specially concurring). 
 160. Id. at 259. 
 161. Id. at 260. 
 162. Id. at 261. 
 163. Id.  
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but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which 
the narrator is the heroine or victim.”164  Judge Bernard noted that the 
Colorado rape shield statute expressly rejected Wigmore’s premise that 
“women accuse men of rape because they have conflated sexual fantasy 
with criminal violence.”165  He added that evidence of past sexual acts 
with others is not probative of present consent.166  And, according to 
Judge Bernard, this lack of probity “extends to evidence about a victim’s 
sexual fantasies.”167  Judge Bernard stated, “Requiring a victim to testify 
about sexual fantasies can be as intrusive as testifying about prior sexual 
acts.”168  To implement the purpose of the rape shield statute, i.e., to 
protect a victim’s privacy, Judge Bernard would have included sexual 
fantasies within the scope of sexual conduct, consistent with Federal 
Rule of Evidence 412.169  Judge Bernard quoted Wright and Graham’s 
treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure to explain that even if 
thoughts are not behavior, “proof of attitudes toward sex can only be 
viewed as an attempt to prove or insinuate sexual conduct by 
circumstantial means.”170 
Essentially, Judge Bernard recognized that sexual fantasies do not fit 
into the definition of “sexual conduct.”171  Nonetheless, he concluded 
that because such evidence involves sexual innuendo, it should be 
categorized as sexual conduct and excluded under the general 
prohibition.172  If such evidence is characterized as sexual conduct for the 
general prohibition, however, then it is potentially admissible as 
evidence of sexual conduct with the defendant.173  That is why Judge 
Bernard joined the majority holding that the victim’s sexual fantasies 
should not be excluded under the consent exception.174 
Young and Garcia show that courts need clarity regarding the 
admissibility of women’s sexual fantasies and dreams under rape shield 
laws.  In both cases, the courts admitted evidence of women’s thoughts 
 
 164. Id. (quoting 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924A 
(James H. Chadbourn ed., 3d ed. 1970)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (citing People v. McKenna, 585 P.2d 275, 278 (Colo. 1978) (en banc)). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (quoting WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 87, § 5384).  
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id. at 262; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(1)(a) (2014) (providing an exception for 
“[e]vidence of the victim’s or witness’ prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the actor”). 
 174. Garcia, 179 P.3d at 262 (Bernard, J., specially concurring). 
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to prove consent even when that evidence had little to no probative 
value.  In Young, the court admitted evidence of a sexual fantasy that the 
victim never communicated directly to Young.175  In Garcia, the court 
admitted evidence of an alleged rape fantasy (that the victim denied) that 
occurred long before Garcia raped the victim.176  The admission of such 
evidence subjects the victim to the intrusion on her privacy that rape 
shield laws were enacted to prevent and relies on sexual stereotypes 
related to women’s sexual fantasies. 
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR EXCLUSION AND A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 
Under Rule 412, sexual fantasies and dreams are “sexual behavior” 
that may be admissible to prove consent.177  That approach fails to fully 
implement the purpose of the rule and undermines policies underlying 
rape shield laws.  In order to exclude such evidence under the current 
paradigm, sexual fantasies and dreams should be categorized as sexual 
predisposition, not sexual behavior, and barred under the consent 
exception.  First, sexual fantasies and dreams do not fit within the 
category of sexual behavior.  Sexual fantasies and dreams are thoughts, 
not actual sexual conduct.  Second, as previously explained, the 
legislative history supports this view.178  The predisposition ban was 
meant to address this type of evidence—evidence that the proponent 
believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder.  Third, sexual 
fantasies and dreams are not even relevant to consent and therefore the 
categorization as sexual predisposition evidence does not unfairly impact 
the defendant.  Fourth, even if relevant, the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.  Finally, the 
admission of such evidence is contrary to the purpose of rape shield 
laws.  Its admission invades the victim’s privacy, is rife with sexual 
innuendo, appeals to sexual stereotypes, and has the potential to cause 
unwarranted outcomes. 
A. Fantasies and Dreams Are Not Behavior 
First, as a threshold matter, sexual fantasies and dreams are not 
behavior and, therefore, the definition in the 1994 Amendment 
 
 175. Commonwealth v. Young, 182 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005). 
 176. Garcia, 179 P.3d at 255. 
 177. FED. R. EVID. 412(b); see also FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 
amendment.  
 178. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
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Committee Notes should be changed to reflect that fact.  The first entry 
in the Oxford English Dictionary defines behavior as the “[m]anner of 
conducting oneself in the external relations of life.”179  Behavior involves 
external actions, and thoughts involve “activities of the mind.”  The 
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines behavior as: (1) “the way in which 
someone conducts oneself or behaves”; 2(a) “the manner of conducting 
oneself”; and 2(b) “anything that an organism does involving action and 
a response to stimulation.”180 
The mainspring of sexual behavior is actual physical acts.181  State 
courts similarly define sexual behavior as physical acts involving sexual 
intercourse, sexual contact, or an attempt to engage in such acts.182  State 
courts have held that sexual behavior includes written or verbal 
descriptions of past sexual activity,183 and a federal court held that a 
victim’s statement propositioning an investigating police officer by 
asking him if he wanted to crawl into bed with her qualified as sexual 
behavior under Rule 412, and was excluded on that basis.184 
Unlike sexual acts or propositions, fantasies and dreams involve an 
individual’s internal life and are, by definition, imagined, even if voiced.  
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines fantasy as “the free play of 
creative imagination” or “a creation of the imaginative faculty whether 
 
 179. Behavior, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 180. Behavior, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/behavior [https://perma.cc/AT42-5CGQ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
 181. See FED. R. EVID. 412(a) advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment (“Past sexual 
behavior connotes all activities that involve physical conduct, i.e. sexual intercourse and sexual 
contact.” (citations omitted)). 
 182. See, e.g., State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2006) (“We are unable to conclude 
that posing nude is per se, sexual conduct . . . .  [P]osing nude does not infer or connote sexual 
activity or conduct.” (quoting State v. Zaehringer, 280 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1979))); State v. 
Wright, 776 P.2d 1294, 1298 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (“‘[P]ast sexual behavior’ means a volitional or 
non-volitional physical act that the victim has performed for the purpose of the sexual stimulation or 
gratification of either the victim or another person or an act that is sexual intercourse, deviate sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact, or an attempt to engage in such an act, between the victim and another 
person.”). 
 183. See, e.g., State v. Fowler, 200 P.3d 591, 593–95, 597 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the 
victim’s diary entries where she described her sexual activities with individuals other than the 
defendant constituted sexual behavior and was inadmissible under Oregon’s rape shield law); Violett 
v. Commonwealth, 907 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Ky. 1995) (affirming the trial court’s exclusion of letters 
the victim wrote to her boyfriend describing her sexual activities with him as sexual behavior 
covered by the general rape shield prohibition).  
 184. United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569, 572–73 (8th Cir. 2009).  Regardless, there is a 
distinction between a verbalized intent to engage in sex with the accused directed at the accused at or 
near the time of the rape or sexual assault versus a victim relating a fantasy or dream about having 
sex with the accused.  The former expresses a conscious desire (although not determinative or 
conclusive of consent) and the latter, is, by definition, based on creative imagination or even 
unconscious thought. 
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expressed or merely conceived.”185  The American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language defines fantasy as “[t]he creative 
imagination.”186  The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology defines fantasy 
as “the mental process of imagining objects, symbols, or events not 
immediately present.”187  And, social science researchers in the area of 
sexual fantasies define them as “acts of imagination.”188  In a study of 
more than 23,000 sexual fantasies, a researcher and clinician found that 
sexual fantasies are “extensions of our capacity for creativity . . . putting 
us on a more even keel psychologically.”189 
Dreams are not even the object of the conscious mind.  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines dreams 
as “[a] series of images, ideas, emotions, and sensations occurring 
involuntarily in the mind during certain stages of sleep,”190 as does 
Webster’s New World Medical Dictionary.191  Sleep researchers 
characterize dreams as “perceptual expression and dramatization of the 
dreamer’s thoughts,” which “seem to be self-governing and out of our 
control.”192  Fantasies and dreams are not, in any meaningful sense, 
“behavior.” 
B. The History of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Establishes That the 
Predisposition Ban Was Meant to Encompass Sexual Fantasies and 
Dreams. 
Second, the history of the 1994 amendment to Rule 412 supports 
categorizing sexual fantasies and dreams as sexual predisposition rather 
than sexual behavior.  It shows that the rationale for adding sexual 
predisposition to the general prohibition was to bar evidence that fit 
awkwardly, if at all, into the sexual behavior category, such as evidence 
 
 185. Fantasy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
behavior [https://perma.cc/L22L-KP8S] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
 186. Fantasy, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=fantasy [https://perma.cc/A8AX-AEHE] (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
 187. Fantasy, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY (4th ed. 2009).  
 188. Jenny Bivona & Joseph Critelli, The Nature of Women’s Rape Fantasies: An Analysis of 
Prevalence, Frequency, and Contents, 46 J. SEX RES. 33, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Bivona & Critelli, 
The Nature of Women’s Rape Fantasies]. 
 189. BRETT KAHR, WHO’S BEEN SLEEPING IN YOUR HEAD: THE SECRET WORLD OF SEXUAL 
FANTASIES 376 (2009). 
 190. Dream, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 
2015).  
 191. Dream, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD MEDICAL DICTIONARY, https://ahdictionary.com/word/ 
search.html?q=dream [https://perma.cc/6RSJ-NJFJ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).  
 192. WILLIAM H. MOORCROFT, UNDERSTANDING SLEEP AND DREAMING 153 (2d ed. 2013). 
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of sexual thoughts, dreams, and fantasies.193  Sexual fantasies and dreams 
are the type of evidence the predisposition ban was meant to prohibit.  
Professor Berger explained at the Committee’s only meeting on 
amending Rule 412 that the Rule established two categories: (1) sexual 
behavior, which involves “actual sexual activity,” and (2) sexual 
predisposition, which involves “sexual innuendo.”194  Fantasies and 
dreams do not involve actual sexual activity, and may not even involve 
sexual innuendo, but may be susceptible to such an interpretation.  Thus, 
evidence of fantasies and dreams fits more comfortably within the 
confines of sexual predisposition evidence. 
Evidence characterized as sexual predisposition evidence, however, 
may not represent actual sexual predisposition.  Professor Berger noted 
that the addition of “predisposition” within the rule was to cover 
evidence being “offered for the inference that the victim engaged in prior 
sexual conduct.”195  And the Advisory Committee Notes explain that the 
predisposition exclusion is meant “to exclude evidence that does not 
directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent 
believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder.”196  For 
example, the Note describes dress as evidence covered under the 
predisposition category.197  Dress does not connote a sexual 
predisposition, but it may have a sexual connotation for the fact-finder.  
For this reason, such evidence is excluded under the rule.  Similarly, 
sexual fantasies and dreams do not represent a sexual predisposition, but 
such evidence may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder.198 
C. Sexual Fantasies and Dreams Are Not Relevant to Consent 
Third, the exclusion of such evidence does not unfairly prejudice the 
defendant because it is not relevant to consent.199  Under Federal Rule of 
 
 193. Berger, Comments Memo, supra note 72, at 5–6. 
 194. Evidence Advisory Committee Minutes May 6–7, 1993, supra note 92, at 5.  
 195. Berger, Comments Memo, supra note 72, at 20. 
 196. FED. R. EVID. 412(a) advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
 197. Id.  
 198. The categorization of evidence as sexual predisposition evidence or sexual behavior 
evidence under Rule 412 is problematic.  The sexual predisposition category contains evidence—
such as dress, fantasies and dreams, or lifestyle—that does not show sexual predisposition.  
However, categorizing sexual fantasies and dreams as predisposition evidence in the Advisory 
Committee’s Note may accomplish the goal, consistent with the purpose of the rule, of excluding 
this type of evidence in criminal cases under the current paradigm.   
 199. The exclusion of victim’s sexual fantasies and dreams would not violate the Confrontation 
Clause.  Rape shield laws have been upheld against Sixth Amendment claims.  See, e.g., United 
States v. A.S., 939 F.3d 1063, 1073 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “the class of cases in which 
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Evidence 402, only relevant evidence is admissible.200  Under Rule 401, 
“[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”201  An expression of imagined 
thoughts, not based in reality, and, in some cases even unconscious, does 
not make the fact of consent more or less likely.  Fantasies about sex 
with the defendant does not make it more likely that the victim actually 
agreed to have sex with the defendant on a particular occasion.  
Women’s dreams do not suggest real-life consent. 
Social science research on women’s sexual fantasies supports this 
conclusion.  In a study of male and female sexual fantasies, researchers 
concluded that women’s fantasies of dominance and submission were not 
correlated with actual sexual attitudes.202  In other words, there is not an 
 
evidence otherwise barred by the rape shield statute has been deemed to be constitutionally 
compelled is restricted to those which demonstrate a theory of witness bias or motive to lie” and 
holding that the defendant’s theory did not fall within that limited constitutional exception (quoting 
Rosanna Cavallaro, Rape Shield Evidence and the Hierarchy of Impeachment, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
295, 299 (2019))).  See also United States v. Lockhart, 844 F.3d 501, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(rejecting the defendant’s Confrontation Clause claim based on the district court’s exclusion of 
evidence of the victim’s prior- and post-indictment acts of prostitution under Rule 412 finding that 
the exclusion did not abridge defendant’s ability to present a defense).  The purpose of the exclusion, 
in addition to protecting victim privacy and encouraging reporting of sexual assault, is to exclude 
evidence that is not relevant and may result in unwarranted verdicts based on sexual stereotypes.  
For instance, in United States v. Never Misses a Shot, the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant’s claim 
that the district court’s exclusion of evidence under Rule 412 of the victim’s prior molestation by 
another perpetrator violated his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause.  781 F.3d 1017, 
1029 (8th Cir. 2015).  The court found that Confrontation Clause rights are limited and the 
limitations include “concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ 
safety or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Pumpkin Seed, 572 F.3d 552, 560 (8th Cir. 2009)).  Evidence that is not relevant cannot implicate 
the Sixth Amendment.  Further, the Sixth Amendment is not implicated if the probative value of 
evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.  See United States v. Torres, 
937 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding an incident that occurred approximately six months 
after alleged sexual abuse was not relevant, and, therefore, the Confrontation Clause did not mandate 
that defendant be allowed to cross-examine witness about the incident; evidence was not admissible 
under the exception to the rape shield rule that would render evidence of past sexual behavior 
admissible if evidence was constitutionally required).  See also Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 
872 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[L]egitimate state interests behind a rape shield statute such as giving rape 
victims heightened protection against ‘surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy’ 
may allow the exclusion of relevant evidence if the state’s interest in excluding the evidence 
outweigh the defendant’s interests in having the evidence admitted.” (quoting Michigan v. Lucas, 
500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991))). 
 200. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 201. FED. R. EVID. 401.  
 202. Eileen L. Zurbriggen & Megan R. Yost, Power, Desire, and Pleasure in Sexual Fantasies, 
41 J. SEX RES. 288, 295 (2004).  The study concluded that male sexual fantasies of dominance were 
correlated with rape myth acceptance, and because attitudes such as rape myth acceptance have been 
found to be correlated with aggressive sexual behavior, these fantasies may be associated with 
“victim-blaming attitudes about rape.”  Id. at 297–98.  The authors note that further research is 
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association between women’s sexual fantasies and behavior.  The authors 
conclude that “women us[e] fantasy as a safe space to focus on their own 
desire and pleasure.”203  Because women’s sexual fantasies are not 
correlated to behavior, such evidence cannot make a fact of consequence 
more or less likely. 
Research into women’s rape fantasies further supports the argument 
that sexual fantasy evidence is not probative of consent.  First, there is 
scientific consensus that “mental imagery of realistic violent rape is 
almost never an erotic experience and that nearly all women have no 
interest in acting out a realistic fantasy of rape.”204  Second, research into 
women’s aversive rape fantasies—for example, where the fantasizer is 
resistant throughout the fantasy, where the fantasizer’s character in the 
fantasy is attacked while in a vulnerable position, where the fantasizer 
describes the fantasy as at a minimum as unpleasant—shows that these 
fantasies generally generate “feelings such as guilt, shame, and 
embarrassment.”205  Rather than involving wish fulfillment, the authors 
concluded that aversive rape fantasies “operate as attempts to deal with 
the fear of actual rape by gaining some sense of control over rape 
situations and rehearsing how one might deal with actual rape.”206  
Aversive rape fantasies do not represent a woman’s desire to be raped; 
rather, they are attempts to deal with the trauma of rape. 
The admissibility of a woman’s rape fantasy as evidence of consent 
is grounded in the view that a rape fantasy is evidence that a woman 
wants to be raped and that the rape fantasy involves wish fulfillment.  
Empirical data does not support this view, as women who experience 
rape fantasies are no more likely to be raped than other women.207  And, 
as discussed above, there is scientific consensus that “nearly all women 
have no interest in acting out a realistic fantasy of rape.”208  The 
stereotype of a rape fantasy as wish fulfillment ignores that the fantasy is 
a powerful experience on its own, and does not involve the desire to 
actually be raped or to consent to sex in a rape fantasy paradigm.  
Women’s rape fantasies do not involve wish fulfillment, are not relevant 
to consent, and should be excluded. 
 
necessary to determine if such fantasies have a causal relationship to victim blaming.  Id. at 298. 
 203. Id. at 298. 
 204. Bivona & Critelli, The Nature of Women’s Rape Fantasies, supra note 188, at 34 (citations 
omitted). 
 205. Id. at 43.  
 206. Id. at 43–44 (citations omitted).  
 207. Jenny Bivona & Joseph Critelli, Women’s Erotic Rape Fantasies: An Evaluation of Theory 
and Research, 45 J. SEX RES. 57, 67 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 208. Bivona & Critelli, The Nature of Women’s Rape Fantasies, supra note 188, at 34. 
648 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
D. The Admission of Fantasies and Dreams as Evidence of Consent Is 
Unfairly Prejudicial and May Cause Unwarranted Outcomes 
Fourth, even if evidence of sexual fantasies and dreams were 
arguably relevant, its limited probative value is far outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.  The admission of such evidence creates the 
real danger of unfair prejudice because of extant stereotypes of women’s 
rape fantasies as wish fulfillment.  Based on these stereotypes the jury 
could infer that because the woman had a sexual or rape fantasy, she 
wanted to be raped or consented to the perpetrator’s actions, thus causing 
an unwarranted outcome based on social stereotypes—the precise harm 
that rape shield laws aimed to prevent. 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, a court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of 
unfair prejudice.209  In Old Chief v. United States, the Supreme Court 
defined “unfair prejudice,” as applied to a criminal defendant, as “an 
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, 
though not necessarily, an emotional one.”210  The Court explained that 
“[s]uch improper grounds certainly include . . . generalizing a 
defendant’s earlier bad act into bad character and taking that as raising 
the odds that he did the later bad act not now charged.”211  Although Old 
Chief addresses unfair prejudice in the context of a defendant and 
references prior bad acts, the same principle is applicable here.  The 
admission of a woman’s sexual fantasies and dreams to prove consent 
generalizes her expression of sexual fantasy as evidence that she “wants 
it” or of wish fulfillment, raising the odds that she consented to sex with 
the defendant.  This suggests a decision on an improper basis and is the 
type of unfair prejudice the Court warned against. 
1. People v. Jovanovic 
Young and Garcia show the danger of unfair prejudice generated by 
the admission of women’s sexual fantasies.212  Those state appellate 
courts found evidence of sexual fantasies material and relevant even 
though they had little or no probative value.213  The courts generalized 
 
 209. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 210. 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Commonwealth v. Young, 182 S.W.3d 221 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Colorado v. Garcia, 
179 P.3d 250 (Colo. App. 2007); see also infra Part III. 
 213. Young, 182 S.W.3d at 224–25; Garcia, 179 P.3d at 257–58. 
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the victims’ fantasies as raising the odds that she consented.214  Similarly, 
in People v. Jovanovic, a New York appellate court found the victim’s 
fantasies and prior non-normative sexual activity relevant to consent, 
even though the victim’s prior sexual conduct fell squarely within the 
confines of the rape shield law.215  These cases reflect the unfair 
prejudice generated by women’s sexual activity and sexual fantasies that 
fall outside normative standards. 
In Jovanovic, the court reversed a trial court’s exclusion of 
statements in four emails from the victim to the defendant concerning her 
fantasies about snuff films and comments that “evinced or implied some 
degree of interest in sadomasochism.”216  It is important to note that 
Jovanovic does not involve sexual fantasies of the victim that involve the 
defendant.217  The excluded emails concern prior sexual conduct of the 
victim with another individual involving Bondage and Discipline, 
Dominance and Submission, Sadism and Masochism (BDSM), sexual 
conduct of other individuals (not the defendant or the victim), and 
statements that show the victim had an interest in BDSM with others.218  
Not one of the contested statements concerned a fantasy involving the 
defendant or actual sexual conduct between the victim and the defendant.  
Not one statement expressed her desire to have actual sexual conduct 
with the defendant.  Nevertheless, the appellate court found the evidence 
relevant to consent on the ground that the messages were meant to 
convey “her interest in exploring the subject of such activities with 
him.”219  Jovanovic demonstrates the danger of unfair prejudice and 
unwarranted outcomes resulting from sexual stereotypes regarding 
women’s sexual fantasies or what is considered non-normative sexual 
conduct.  Because the victim evidenced an interest in BDSM generally, 
the appellate court concluded that the jury could infer she was interested 
in BDSM with the defendant, even though her emails at issue on appeal 
did not express that interest.220 
Jovanovic was charged with kidnapping, sexual abuse, and sexual 
assault.221  According to the victim’s testimony at trial, she and 
Jovanovic communicated by email beginning in the summer of 1996 and 
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 216. Id. at 191. 
 217. See id. at 184–86. 
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decided to meet for the first time the evening of November 22.222  They 
went out to dinner and planned to see a movie after eating.223  After 
dinner, however, Jovanovic asked the victim “if she wanted to see a 
video at his apartment.”224  The victim testified that she told Jovanovic, 
“I don’t know,” because she did not want to but struggled being 
assertive.225  Nonetheless, the victim and Jovanovic went back to his 
apartment, and watched a video where “Muppet-like characters” had sex 
and were violent.226  Jovanovic served the victim some tea that the victim 
said had a “chemical taste” to it.227  During the movie, “Jovanovic left 
the room and returned with some strips of fabric.”228  After the movie 
ended, Jovanovic ordered her, in a stern voice, to take her shirt and pants 
off and then he tied her arms and legs to a futon using the strips of 
cloth.229  The victim said “she did not protest because she did not know 
what to think.”230  He then began pouring hot candle wax onto her 
stomach.231  She told him to stop and demanded that he untie her.232  He 
then pulled her panties off, dripped wax on her vaginal area, and poured 
wax on her nipples.233  At one point he gagged her, blindfolded her, and 
then bit her nipples and collarbone.234  After about an hour, he carried her 
to his bedroom and the victim said, “[D]on’t rape me, don’t dismember 
me, don’t kill me.”235  At one point, he tied her up so that she was on her 
stomach and her feet were tied up behind her.236  He then “penetrated her 
rectum with either a baton or his penis, causing the complainant intense 
pain.”237  She woke up at some point on November 23, still tied up.238  
He untied her, but she subsequently tried to escape, so Jovanovic “tied 
her up again.”239  Later that evening, she was able to escape, although he 
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fought to restrain her.240  The victim rode the subway to her dormitory, 
received a call from her friend Luke, went to his apartment, and told him 
Jovanovic tied her up, sodomized her with a stick, hit her with a baton, 
and burned her.241 
The defendant asserted a consent defense.242  He sought admission of 
emails to show the victim’s state of mind regarding consent and his own 
state of mind regarding the victim’s intentions.243  The appeal centered 
on four emails where the trial court required redactions under the rape 
shield law.244  The trial court admitted numerous emails between the 
victim and the defendant.  The victim and Jovanovic met over the 
internet in the summer of 1996.245  Jovanovic told the victim, an 
undergraduate student at Barnard, that “he studied molecular genetics 
and computational biology at Columbia.”246  In their first online 
conversation, Jovanovic stated his “interest in the grotesque, the bizarre, 
and the occult,” and talked about a photographer who used corpses in his 
pictures.247  The victim mentioned “her interest in snuff films (i.e., films 
in which a person is killed).”248 
In October 1996, the victim and Jovanovic exchanged emails where 
she raised the subject of pagan rituals, snuff films, and asked how tall he 
was.249  On November 10, Jovanovic responded to her question about 
how tall he was, asking: “As for my height, why?  Are you looking to be 
dismembered by a tall, dark stranger, or something of that sort?  I’m 
sometimes strange and dark, but of average height, so perhaps you 
should look elsewhere.”250  The victim responded and wrote about the 
Columbia tunnels, their appropriateness for a snuff film, and “asked if he 
had any ideas for murder plots.”251  Jovanovic responded with an email 
about the true story of a man who killed a woman in October 1996 he 
met in person after their online conversations.252  On November 13 and 
14, Jovanovic and the victim continued emailing back and forth about 
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“fantasies for snuff films, and the [victim’s] purported interest in what 
she termed ‘a tall dark dismember-er.’”253  All the aforementioned email 
evidence was admitted at trial.254  Four emails from November 18, 19, 
and 20 were redacted,255 and on appeal, the court held that the redactions 
were a reversible error that “improperly hampered defendant’s ability to 
present a defense.”256 
a. Redaction #1 – One sentence from November 18 email that 
references another woman’s unrelated rape claim 
On November 17, the victim emailed the defendant about having 
taken a woman she knew, Karen, to the emergency room after the 
woman told the victim that she was raped the previous evening and the 
victim told Jovanovic how upset she was.257  Jovanovic responded, 
emailed her his phone number, and asked if the victim wanted to call 
him.258  She replied to the email by asking if this was “a plot to begin 
dismemberment.”259  On November 18, the victim explained to 
Jovanovic her relationship with Karen.260  The victim told Jovanovic that 
she had a prior intimate relationship with Luke, Karen’s ex-boyfriend.261  
The victim also stated that Karen warned her to stay away from Luke.262  
In her email to Jovanovic, the victim described Luke as “attached to one 
skitzophrenic [sic] stalker x-intrest [sic] d’amour.”263 
The trial court ordered only one sentence deleted from that email.264  
The sentence read, “So said intrest [sic] plotted my death as well as a 
means of getting attention, thus the rape,”265 referencing Karen.  The 
victim did not reference any claim of rape that she made; rather, she 
described activity by Luke’s ex-girlfriend.266  Nothing in the email 
references the victim’s relationship to the defendant, nor does she make 
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any statements about the defendant.267 
b. Redaction #2 – Several paragraphs from November 19 email 
describing the victim’s prior sexual relationship with Luke, Luke’s 
sexual assault when he was in high school, and another sexual 
experience of Luke’s 
Jovanovic requested more details about the victim’s relationship with 
Luke.268  On November 19, the victim sent Jovanovic an email 
describing her relationship with Luke and her interactions with Karen.269  
The trial court redacted several paragraphs from this email where the 
victim briefly recounted that Luke previously seduced her.270  She stated, 
“[S]o he seduced me.  [C]ome to Ufm, I did[,] come to my apartment, I 
did[,] then he got me,”271 and gave a description of a sexual assault upon 
Luke that occurred when Luke was in high school.272  She also described 
an experience Luke had with his old boyfriend and a dominatrix.273  
Here, the email either references Luke’s past sexual relationships or the 
victim’s past relationship with Luke.  Nothing in this email references 
anything about the defendant. 
c. Redaction #3 – One phrase from November 19 email and one 
sentence from November 20 email stating that Luke “got her” 
(referencing the victim’s earlier sexual relationship with Luke) and 
where the victim relates Luke was a sadomasochist in their past 
sexual relationship and she was his slave 
Jovanovic responded, again on November 19, “Then he got you?  
How suspenseful.”274  The trial court redacted the words, “[t]hen he got 
you.”275  The trial court also redacted a portion of the victim’s response 
on November 20 where the victim replied, “No duh, there’s more, more 
interesting than sex, yes he did catch me, no sex, but he was a 
sadomasochist and now I’m his slave and its [sic] painful, but the fun of 
telling my friends ‘hey I’m a sadomasochist’ more than outweighs the 
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torment.”276  The trial court did not exclude portions of the November 20 
email where the victim asked about snuff films and where she speaks of 
the taboos surrounding the questions she wants to ask.277  In the email 
she stated, “I think you may just be toying with the idea of 
dismemberment.”278  She also stated she had to “push herself, see how 
far she can take it” and added, “It could get sick.  And just may.”279  
Here, again, the redacted language has nothing to do with the victim and 
Jovanovic’s relationship.  It only discloses the victim and Luke’s prior 
sadomasochistic relationship. 
d. Redaction #4 – One sentence from November 20 email where the 
victim states that she is at times a “pushy bottom” (submissive) 
Jovanovic responded to her November 20 email and asked if she was 
submissive at times.280  The trial court redacted the following from her 
response: “[A]nd yes, I’m what those happy pain fiends at the Vault call 
a ‘pushy bottom.’”281  The victim did not express her desire to enter into 
a sadomasochistic relationship with Jovanovic, and the victim and 
Jovanovic did not discuss the parameters of any sexual relationship. 
The trial court found the redacted portions of the emails were 
inadmissible under New York’s rape shield law because “they 
constituted evidence of the [victim’s] prior sexual conduct, having the 
effect of demonstrating her ‘unchastity.’”282  The trial court also 
precluded the defense from questioning the victim or Luke about 
“whether the two had mutually engaged in consensual 
sadomasochism.”283  Finally, although Jovanovic was permitted to ask 
Luke whether he caused the victim’s bruise visible on November 24, he 
was barred from asking “whether Luke’s own conduct toward the 
[victim] at any prior time had caused any bruising.”284 
The appeals court rejected the trial court’s analysis and held that the 
New York rape shield law did not support excluding the redacted 
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statements and precluding the proposed questions.285  The court found 
that the redacted email messages were not subject to the protections of 
the rape shield law “because they did not constitute evidence of the 
sexual conduct of the complainant.  Rather, they were merely evidence 
of statements made by the complainant about herself to Jovanovic.”286  
The court drew a “distinction between evidence of prior sexual conduct 
and evidence of statements concerning past or contemplated sexual 
conduct.”287  The court reasoned that evidence of sexual conduct “would 
generally be introduced (if admissible) as a basis to infer that she had 
voluntarily behaved in such a way on prior occasions with others,”288 and 
therefore more likely behaved the same way in the case at trial.  But a 
statement about sexual conduct “is frequently relevant not to prove the 
truth of the matter stated, but rather, for the fact that the speaker made 
the statement.  That is, a statement may be relevant as proof of the 
speaker’s, or listener’s, state of mind.”289  Specifically addressing the 
victim’s statements here, the court found: 
[T]he [victim’s] statements to Jovanovic regarding sadomasochism 
were not necessarily offered to prove the truth of what she said, i.e. that 
she actually was a sadomasochist.  Rather, much of their importance 
lay in the fact that she chose to say these things to Jovanovic in the 
context of her electronic, on-line conversation with him, so as to 
convey to him another message, namely, her interest in exploring the 
subject of such activities with him.290 
Thus, because the victim evinced an interest in BDSM in the past and 
defined herself as submissive, the court concluded that she was interested 
in a sexual relationship with Jovanovic.291 
The court conflates a hearsay analysis with a rape shield analysis, 
apparently finding the evidence relevant and admissible because, 
according to the court, the statements go to the victim’s state of mind and 
are not allegedly offered for their truth.292  This analysis fails to address 
rape shield issues.  The statements, even if offered to show her state of 
mind, are also offered to show her sexual tendency toward 
sadomasochism.  This would allow the jury to infer, based on prior 
 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 193.  
 287. Id. at 194. 
 288. Id. at 193. 
 289. Id.  
 290. Id. at 193–94. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
656 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
sexual conduct with other individuals and not the defendant, that she 
consented to sex with the defendant.  In fact, the court concluded that the 
redactions limited the victim from being fully cross-examined about 
statements that imply her interest in sadomasochism.293  Even though the 
court noted that rape shield laws reject the premise that the character of a 
woman for chastity is probative or relevant to consent,294 the admission 
of emails describing her prior sexual conduct or professed predisposition 
to sadomasochism is admitted precisely for that purpose, i.e., because she 
professed some interest in sadomasochism.295 
The redacted emails discuss the victim’s sexual conduct with others, 
sexual conduct of others, or non-sexual actions she took related to others.  
This evidence fits squarely within the protections of the rape shield law.  
For example, the first redacted email references Luke’s ex-girlfriend’s 
rape allegation.296  The second redacted email describes the victim’s 
prior sexual relationship with another person, Luke’s sexual assault when 
he was in high school, and Luke’s prior sexual history.297  The third 
redacted email explicitly addressed the victim’s interaction with Luke 
where she alleged both she and Luke were sadomasochists.298  The 
redaction in the fourth email (“and yes, I’m what those happy pain fiends 
at the Vault call a ‘pushy bottom’”) addresses the victim’s role as a 
submissive.299  In the email, the victim neither stated she wanted to be 
Jovanovic’s pushy bottom, asked about having sex with Jovanovic, nor 
consented to sex with Jovanovic.300 
The appellate court’s holding and rationale here appear to reflect 
judgments about women’s sexuality and non-normative sexual behavior 
and the danger of relying on sexual stereotypes.  According to the court, 
the redacted email statements should have been admitted because the 
statements convey a message to the defendant—“her interest in exploring 
the subject of such activities with him.”301  In other words, because the 
victim’s emails included statements about a past sadomasochistic 
relationship and that she was a submissive, there was probative evidence 
that she consented to such activities with the defendant.  Because the 
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victim engaged in such sexual conduct outside the mainstream in the 
past, the jury could infer her consent to such sexual activity with the 
defendant. 
Recognizing the weakness in the initial rationale for admitting the 
redacted emails, the court offered as an alternative rationale that the 
redacted statements fall within exceptions to the rape shield law.302  First, 
the court found that the statements should be viewed as prior sexual 
conduct with Jovanovic because the statements were so intimate and, 
“[v]iewed with the purpose of her statements in mind,” should not have 
been excluded.303  According to the court, a “history of intimacies 
generally “bolster[s] a claim of consent.”304  But Jovanovic and the 
victim did not have a history of intimate sexual contact or conduct; they 
met for the first time the night of the sexual assault.305 
Second, the court concluded that the evidence would be admissible 
under the interests of justice exception.306  The defense did not seek to 
introduce the evidence to show the victim’s “unchastity”; rather, the 
evidence was “relevant to establish that she purposefully conveyed to 
Jovanovic an interest in engaging in consensual sadomasochism with 
him.”307  Under this rationale, any victim who discusses other sexual 
activity with an alleged perpetrator evidences an interest in engaging in 
sexual activities with the perpetrator.  But none of the redacted emails 
describe her desire to engage in such conduct with Jovanovic.308 
More importantly, the court’s finding that the victim’s past BDSM 
activity or her statement that she has been called a “pushy-bottom” is 
evidence of consent worthy of cross-examining the victim shows the 
danger of the admission of this type of evidence.  If the court arrived at 
an unwarranted conclusion based on sexual stereotypes, so could the 
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jury.  According to the court, the emails, which showed that the victim 
had a “master-slave” relationship with another individual, that the victim 
was interested in BDSM, and that she was submissive, would “have 
permitted Jovanovic to effectively place the [victim] in a somewhat less 
innocent, and possibly more realistic, light.”309  In other words, because 
she was involved in previous sadomasochistic relationships, she was 
more likely to have consented to the conduct of the defendant here.  
Because a woman expressed interest or experience with a non-
mainstream sexual activity with individuals other than the perpetrator, 
the court admitted evidence of that activity so that the jury can infer 
consent.  That is the admission of prior sexual conduct with other 
individuals to show that the victim acted in conformity therewith and 
contravenes the entire purpose of the rape shield laws. 
The holdings in Garcia, Young, and Jovanovic illustrate the danger 
of unfair prejudice and unwarranted outcomes based on the admission of 
women’s sexual fantasies or dreams or any non-mainstream sexual 
activity—the same danger that propelled the enactment of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 412.  In 1976, at a congressional hearing on Rule 412, a 
Deputy Chief in the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice 
testified regarding the admissibility of sexual conduct of a victim: 
[W]hatever marginal relevance such evidence may possess to show the 
likelihood of the complainant’s consent to a subsequent act of sex is 
considerably outweighed by the public interest in preventing unfair 
prejudice at trial so as to endanger the chances of obtaining a rational 
verdict based on the totality of evidence, as well as protecting the 
privacy of the victim and combatting the well documented reluctance 
of victims of forcible sex offenses to report such incidents because of 
fear that their reputations and private lives will be unduly exposed to 
the “unfeeling scrutiny of the courtroom.”310 
This quote is as applicable to the admission of sexual fantasies and 
dreams as it was to prior sexual conduct of the victim.  The admission of 
the victim’s sexual fantasies or dreams not only invades the victim’s 
privacy, but it also endangers the chances of obtaining a rational verdict. 
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E. Admission of Sexual Fantasies and Dreams as Evidence of Consent 
Is Contrary to the Purpose of Rape Shield Laws 
Finally, the purpose of rape shield laws is to “safeguard the alleged 
victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and 
sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate 
sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding 
process.”311  The admission of sexual fantasies and dreams as evidence of 
consent contravenes each of these objectives.  First, exposing a victim’s 
thoughts, or her unconscious dreams, invades her private internal life.  
As Judge Bernard explained in Garcia, “[r]equiring a victim to testify 
about sexual fantasies can be as intrusive as testifying about prior sexual 
acts.”312  Second, as noted earlier, fantasies are the function of creative 
imagination and dreams are unconscious thoughts.  Being compelled to 
disclose information that is not even based in reality, thoughts an 
individual would not contemplate disclosing in open court, does not 
safeguard the victim.  Third, as shown above, such disclosure infuses 
sexual stereotypes and innuendo into the trial process, potentially causing 
unwarranted outcomes.  The admission of such evidence contravenes the 
purpose of rape shield laws. 
F. Fantasies and Dreams as Sexual Predisposition 
In order to exclude the victim’s sexual fantasies or dreams from 
admission under the consent exception, the 1994 Amendment Advisory 
Committee Notes to Rule 412 needs to change.  Specifically, the 
definition of sexual behavior should not include “activities of the mind, 
such as fantasies or dreams,” and that language (and the accompanying 
cite to Wright and Graham’s Federal Practice and Procedure)313 should 
be excised from that portion of the Notes.  Additionally, in subdivision 
(b) of the Notes, which characterizes “voiced sexual fantasies involving 
the specific accused” as an example of the type of specific instances of 
conduct of the accused that would be admissible under the consent 
exception,314 should also be excised. 
In order to ensure that the victim’s sexual fantasies or dreams are 
covered under the general prohibition of Rule 412, the definition of 
sexual predisposition in the Notes should include “thoughts, such as 
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fantasies or dreams.”  That portion of the Notes should read: 
 The rule has been amended to also exclude all other evidence 
relating to an alleged victim of sexual misconduct that is offered to 
prove a sexual predisposition.  This amendment is designed to exclude 
evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but 
that the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the 
factfinder.  Admission of such evidence would contravene Rule 412’s 
objectives of shielding the alleged victim from potential embarrassment 
and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical thinking.  
Consequently, unless the (b)(2) exception is satisfied [the civil 
exception], evidence such as that relating to the alleged victim’s mode 
of dress, speech, or lifestyle, or thoughts, such as fantasies or 
dreams, will not be admissible.315 
This change to the Advisory Committee Notes would directly impact 
federal rape shield law.  Although not binding, federal courts have relied 
on the Notes to interpret the Rules of Evidence.  In terms of state rape 
shield laws, courts have relied, at least in part, on the 1994 Amendment 
Advisory Committee Notes to justify admission of sexual fantasies.  The 
categorization of sexual fantasies and dreams as sexual predisposition 
rather than sexual behavior no longer allows state courts to rely on the 
federal rules to justify admission of such evidence, and will hopefully 
spur states to amend their statutes to exclude such evidence. 
The current paradigm does not effectuate the purpose of rape shield 
laws.  The holdings in Young, Garcia, and Jovanovic show that Rules 
401 and 403 are not sufficient to bar this type of evidence.  A bright line 
rule is needed.  Only by recharacterizing fantasies and dreams as sexual 
predisposition, rather than sexual behavior, will this type of evidence be 
excluded under the current rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Rape shield laws were enacted as a response to the chastity 
requirement in traditional rape law and generally prohibit admission of 
evidence of the victim’s prior sexual behavior and sexual predisposition.  
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But the consent exception is commonly used.  Because the consent 
exception allows evidence of sexual behavior, and the 1994 Amendment 
Advisory Committee Notes define sexual behavior to include fantasies 
and dreams, evidence of a victim’s fantasies and dreams may be 
admissible to prove consent.  The assumption underlying admissibility, 
that women’s sexual thoughts make the fact of consent more likely, relies 
on stereotypes of women’s sexuality.  And as a result of those 
stereotypes, the consequence may be the admission and consideration of 
women’s thoughts that should be excluded. 
In 1976, Judge Patricia Boyle testified in front of the House 
Committee considering the creation of Rule 412.  Judge Boyle asked: 
“Do we recognize the right of women to make free and private choices 
about their own sexual lives or not?”316  The answer is still no.  The 
admissibility of women’s sexual fantasies and dreams evidences an 
ongoing chastity requirement related to rape prosecution and an 
appropriation of women’s thoughts to diminish her legal rights. 
 
 
 316. Hearings, supra note 38, at 81 (statement of J. Patricia Boyle). 
